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Abstract
This paper identiﬁes parameters responsible for welfare reversals when the
basic New Keynesian model is approximated. In our setting, a reversal occurs
if the Ramsey policy under timeless perspective commitment ceases to be
dominant against an interest rate rule ` a la Taylor (1993) after approximating
the model, or vice versa.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 0931 Introduction
Several ways have been proposed to compute a welfare-optimizing monetary policy
in the New Keynesian model. Kahn et al. (2003) and King and Wolman (1999)
derive ﬁrst-order conditions by maximizing household utility subject to the model
economy. Another method by Kahn et al. (2003), Kim and Kim (2006), and King
and Wolman (1999) consists in computing a ﬁrst-order approximation of the exact
ﬁrst-order conditions. While welfare in the nonlinear environment is measured by
household utility, the approximated setup requires a second-order loss function along
the lines of Benigno and Woodford (2004, 2006), Damjanovic and Nolan (2011), and
Woodford (1999, 2003). Alternatively, Benigno and Woodford (2004, 2006) propose
the minimization of the second-order loss function using a ﬁrst-order approximation
of the model economy as a constraint.
In a ﬁrst step, we compute the Ramsey monetary policy under a timeless perspec-
tive commitment. We compare the resulting welfare loss to an interest rate rule ` a la
Taylor (1993) after simulating a stagﬂationary cost-push shock. In the second step,
the same comparison is pursued in the approximated model version following Kahn
et al. (2003), Kim and Kim (2006), and King and Wolman (1999). We ﬁnd a po-
tential for contradictory policy recommendations when applying the approximated
model. This inconsistency of policy rankings is denominated as a “relative welfare
reversal” and it may depend on (deep) parameters inﬂuencing the curvature of the
target function or the persistence degree of shocks. An increasing curvature or a
higher degree of shock persistence may enhance the possibility of relative welfare
reversals. However, certain parameters can be more inﬂuential than others. The
aim of this paper is to identify these parameters and to assess the parameter values
that may cause the relative welfare reversal eﬀect.
The remainder is as follows. Section 2 presents the model and monetary policy al-
ternatives. Section 3 approximates them. Section 4 presents simulation results and
explores parameter regions which may cause welfare reversals. Section 5 summarizes
our results and provides concluding remarks.
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The standard New Keynesian model for a cashless economy consists of a ﬁnal good
producer, intermediate goods ﬁrms, households, and the monetary authority. We
introduce real adjustment costs in the spirit of Rotemberg (1982) and Hairault and
Portier (1993). The following sections present the model in detail.
2.1 Final Good Producer
The ﬁnal good producer demands a continuum of monopolistically oﬀered interme-
diate goods Yt(i), which are assembled towards the ﬁnal product Yt with a CES
production technology. The ﬁnal product is sold in a perfectly competitive market.





















The elasticity of substitution between input varieties ǫt is assumed to vary over time









exp{et} , 0 ≤ ρ < 1, (3)
where ǫ is the steady state elasticity and ρ gives the degree of persistence in the
shock process. The ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt maximization yields the demand
schedule for input variety i:






Inserting this equation into the CES technology (2) gives the aggregate price index
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The intermediate ﬁrm production Yt(i) requires labor hours Nt(i):
Yt(i) = Nt(i)1−α , 0 ≤ α < 1, (6)





Taking the ﬁrst derivative of (7) subject to the production function (6) gives real
marginal costs as









An intermediate ﬁrm chooses Pt(i) in order to maximize real proﬁts subject to
the demand schedule (4). By doing so, the ﬁrm faces real quadratic costs of price









, ψ ≥ 0. (9)
The parameter ψ denotes the marginal adjustment cost reaction on deviations of
price relations
Pt
Pt−1 from steady state gross inﬂation π. An intermediate ﬁrm chooses










⎤ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎦
(10)
subject to (4) and (9), where ∆t,t+k = βk ∂Ut+k ∂Ct+k
∂Ut ∂Ct is the stochastic discount factor
for real proﬁt income ﬂows to the representative household. The ﬁrst-order condition
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is given by




Note that setting ψ = 0 gives the monopolistic price-setting without costs of adjust-
ment:
Pt(i) =  tPtMCt(i). (13)
2.3 Households
There is a continuum of households j ∈ [0,1] maximizing the following discounted
















σ > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption and 1
η > 0
is the real wage elasticity of labor supply. The household saves in one-period nominal
bonds Bt(j) at the gross deposit rate Rt and receives real dividends Divr
t(j) from












Diﬀerentiation of (14) with respect to Ct(j), Nt(j), and Bj(j) subject to (15) gives












where λt(j) is the Lagrange multiplier of agent j.
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We assume a symmetric equilibrium. The market clearing for each intermediate
good implies
Y d
t (i) = Y s






and the symmetry assumption implies that all intermediate ﬁrms face the same
price-setting problem. Therefore, they set the same price, which implies Pt(i) = Pt
and Yt(i) = Yt. Moreover, we neglect the index j since all households are assumed
to be identical. Inserting (16) into (18) gives the consumption Euler equation
C−σ
t = βEt C−σ
t+1 Rtπ−1
t+1 , (20)








Using ∆t,t+1 ∆t,t = (Ct+1 Ct)
−σ, the ﬁrst-order condition of the intermediate ﬁrm
(11) can be rewritten as












which represents a nonlinear New Keynesian Phillips curve. Aggregate real marginal
costs and real output are given by












t , 0 ≤ α < 1. (24)
The economy-wide resource utilization is given by the aggregate budget constraint of
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Inserting (26) into (25) gives the overall resource constraint




2 , ψ ≥ 0. (27)
As can be seen, ψ > 0 limits the resources available for aggregate consumption.
2.5 Monetary Policy
The monetary authority is either following the Ramsey policy under a timeless
perspective commitment or a simple interest rate rule. The Ramsey planner aims
to maximize household utility subject to the model economy1. In our setting, the
constraints to be taken into consideration are the aggregate resource constraint (27)
and the New Keynesian Phillips curve (22). Substitution of Wt Pt, MCt, and Yt
with (21), (23), and (24) gives the constraints only in terms of the control variables






2 = 0 (28)
and



















  = 0.
(29)
1 See for example Kahn et al. (2003).
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where λ1,t and λ2,t are the respective Lagrange multipliers. The ﬁrst-order conditions
with respect to Ct, Nt, and πt are given by
Et
⎡ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎣
C−σ










































t (ǫt −1) 
1−α
ψ
  = 0





⎡ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎣






⎤ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎦
. (33)
Note that λ1,t is a jump variable, while λ2,t is predetermined. The initial value
of the latter will be set such that it is non-zero and equalized to its steady state
value, which implies that the Ramsey policy is of a timeless perspective nature. This
means that the policy maker credibly commits to a time-invariant policy strategy
with the disadvantage that aggregate utility is not at its globally optimal level. The
alternative strategy is to commit to an interest rate rule with the gross interest rate
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state. The parameter φ > 0 allows for interest rate smoothing behaviour. Setting
φ = 0 gives the nonlinear form of the interest rate rule proposed by Taylor (1993)2.
2.6 Welfare Measure

















0 > 0 for σ > 1 and η > 0. We compare absolute welfare losses between the
two policy strategies by computing the following measure of relative (rel.) welfare:
V rel.






Therefore, the interest rate rule is superior to the Ramsey policy under timeless
perspective commitment if V rel.
0 < 100%.
3 Approximations
As an alternative to the nonlinear setting presented so far, we take a ﬁrst-order
Taylor approximation in logarithms around the non-stochastic steady state. In the
following, we provide the steady state relationships and the approximated model
equations.
3.1 Steady State
We solve for the non-stochastic steady state by dropping all time indices. The
optimality condition (21), the production function (24), and the aggregate resource
2 Note that the values of the reaction parameters δπ, δy, and φ will be set following the literature
and are therefore given ad hoc. That is, we will not search for optimal reaction parameter values
in the sense of optimal simple policy rules.
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C = Y. (39)





















Using (40) and (41) in order to eliminate W P and MC in (42) and solving for Y
delivers







which is the steady state level of real output. Inserting (43) into (38) and into (40)
gives the steady state levels

















We assume no trend inﬂation, which implies π = 1. From the consumption Euler
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computed as





























 CσNη − 
1−α
 
 N−α . (50)
3.2 Model Approximation
The ﬁrst-order approximation of the model is of the form  Xt−X
X   ≈ log(Xt) −
log(X) ≡ ˆ Xt. The core equations (20), (21), (22), (23), (24), (27), and the au-
toregressive process (3) are then rewritten as
ˆ Ct = Et  ˆ Ct+1 −
1
σ
  ˆ Rt −Et[ˆ πt+1] , (51)
ˆ Wt − ˆ Pt = σ ˆ Ct +η ˆ Nt, (52)
ˆ πt = β Et[ˆ πt+1]+
Y (ǫ−1)
ψ
   MCt + ˆ  t , (53)
  MCt = ˆ Wt − ˆ Pt + 
α
1−α
  ˆ Yt, (54)
ˆ Yt = (1−α) ˆ Nt , 0 ≤ α < 1, (55)
ˆ Yt = ˆ Ct, (56)
10
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ˆ ǫt = ρˆ ǫt−1 +et , 0 ≤ ρ < 1, (57)
where ˆ  t = −(ǫ−1)
−1ˆ ǫt. The ﬁrst-order conditions of the Ramsey planner (31), (32),
and (33) are now given by
σ ǫ(1−σ)λ2N1+η −ψ(1−α)C1−2σ  ψ(1−α)λ1C1−σ 



































































ˆ ǫt = 0,
(59)
and
−λ1ψˆ πt +λ2 Et ˆ λ2,t+1 − ˆ λ2,t +λ2σ  ˆ Ct − ˆ Ct−1  = 0. (60)
The interest rate rule (34) now reads
ˆ Rt = (1−φ) δπˆ πt +δy ˆ Yt +φ ˆ Rt−1. (61)
3.3 Welfare Measure Approximation
According to Benigno and Woodford (2004, 2006), Kim and Kim (2006), and
Woodford (1999, 2003), welfare could be measured by a second-order approximation
of (14). Following Damjanovic and Nolan (2011), the absolute (abs.) welfare loss at
11













































The parameter Φ ≡ 1 − ǫ−1
ǫ gives the monopolistic distortions in the economy at
the steady state. Note that setting σ = 1 reproduces the second-order welfare loss
function derived by Damjanovic and Nolan (2011). Relative welfare (rel.) between
the two policies is compared with
Jrel.







0 > 0, the interest rate rule generates a lower welfare loss than the Ramsey
policy under timeless perspective commitment if Jrel.
0 < 100%.
3 However, Damjanovic and Nolan (2011) set σ = 1, which implies a logarithmic utility term
with respect to consumption. Further, their cost-push shock is due to a direct increase of the
monopolistic markup, while in our case this shock is driven by the price elasticity of demand.
These are the reasons for the algebraically slightly diﬀerent second-order welfare loss function
in our paper. For a detailed derivation under σ ≠ 1 and an elasticity-driven cost-push shock, see
the appendix.
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The parameter values are chosen according to a quarterly time unit. In the follow-
ing, we ﬁx a subset of parameters at constant values for the entire analysis4. We
set the household subjective discount factor β equal to 0.99, implying an annualized
steady state real interest rate of 4 percent. The steady state value of the substitution
elasticitiy between intermediate goods is ǫ = 6. This implies a steady state markup
on intermediate ﬁrms’ marginal costs of 20 percent. Considering the interest rate
rule (34) (or (61)), the parameters are δπ = 1.5 and δy = 0.125. The remaining pa-
rameters are varied along the values of the calibration and estimation literature, but
such that the parameter regions fulﬁll the Blanchard-Kahn stability conditions (see
Blanchard and Kahn (1980)). We let α ∈ [0,0.5] in order to explore the consequence
of diminishing returns to labor. Similarly, ρ ∈ [0,0.9] represents an increasing degree
of persistence in the cost-push shock process. We also let φ ∈ [0,0.8] (increasing will-
ingness to smooth interest rate settings), ψ ∈ [0.001,500] (increasing degree of price
rigidity), σ ∈ [1.001,2.5] (increasing aversion towards intertemporal substitution in
consumption), and η ∈ [2,2.9] (decreasing real wage elasticity of labor supply). The
shock impulse et in the autoregressive process (3) (or (57)) leads to a decrease of
the elasticity of substitution ǫt (or ˆ ǫt) on impact and therefore to an increase of
the markup  t (or ˆ  t). Thus, we simulate a stagﬂationary cost-push shock of one
percent at t = 0. Note that the nonlinear model is deterministic (with perfect fore-
sight), while the approximated framework is stochastic (with et ∼ N (0,1)). In the
ﬁrst step, we simulate the nonlinear model version (3), (20), (21), (22), (23), (24),
and (27) with the interest rate rule (34). In the second step, we replace (34) by the
Ramsey policy conditions (31), (32), and (33). In the third step, V rel.
0 is computed
according to (36). These three steps are repeated in the approximated model (51)-
(61) with Jrel.
0 being computed according to (66). A relative welfare reversal occurs
if Jrel.
0 contradicts V rel.
0 , or vice versa.
4 The choice of this particular subset of parameters is driven by the fact that their values are
almost identical in the calibration and estimation literature across most economies. This is not
the case for the remaining parameters to be varied in the subsequent exercise.
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and ψ. A graphical representation of table 1 is given by ﬁgure 1 and the upper con-
tour plot of ﬁgure 7. The interest rate rule (or Taylor rule, given φ = 0) dominates
against the Ramsey policy under timeless perspective commitment (V rel.
0 < 100%)
for the case of near-price ﬂexibility (ψ = 0.001) and independently of the value of α.
The same conclusion can be drawn for low degrees of price rigidity, with the excep-
tion of ψ = 150 at α = 0.35, α = 0.4, and α = 0.5, where V rel.
0 < 100%. However, the
Ramsey policy under timeless perspective commitment tends to dominate against
the Taylor rule (V rel.
0 > 100%) as the degree of price rigidity ψ increases. A glance
at table 2 and at the ﬁgures 2 and 7 reveals that the policy rankings obtained in
the nonlinear model are almost fully reversed in the approximated setting. In the
case of near-price ﬂexibility (ψ = 0.001), we obtain Jrel.
0 > 100%, but Jrel.
0 < 100%
for ψ ≥ 50 and α ∈ [0,0.35]. While Jrel.
0 decreases for an increasing value of ψ at a
given value of α, the behavior of Jrel.
0 when incrasing α at a given value of ψ is less
clear-cut5. Note that a relative welfare reversal (Jrel.
0 contradicts V rel.
0 ) often occurs
after introducing a higher price persistence at a given value of α6. We therefore
asses the important role that the degree of price ﬂexibility plays for relative welfare
reversals7.
For the remaining parameter variations, we set α = 0 and ψ = 50. This is because at
these values, we have that V rel.
0 < 100% and Jrel.
0 < 100% (see tables 1 and 2)8. In
this manner, we are able to rule out relative welfare reversals induced by α and ψ
and to isolate the reversal eﬀects of the other parameters.
Table 3, ﬁgure 3, and the upper contour plot of ﬁgure 8 show that the interest
rate rule remains dominant in the nonlinear model (V rel.
0 < 100%), for all com-
5 For given values ψ ∈ [0.001,300], Jrel.
0 increases for rising values of α. The opposite can be
observed for ψ ∈ [350,500].
6 An exception are the three last columns of table 2 (α = 0.4, α = 0.45, and α = 0.5 at ψ = 50).
We obtain 10 relative welfare changeovers from a varying value of ψ at given values of α and 9
relative welfare changeovers from variations of α at a given value of ψ.
7 Note that a value of ψ near to zero transforms our model into a close version of a Real Business
Cycle (RBC) model. Therefore, our results point to potentially misleading normative insights
when applying this type of models.
8 Note that this reference point is common across all tables and ﬁgures for the parameter conﬁg-
uration α = 0, ψ = 50, σ = 1.001, η = 2, ρ = 0, φ = 0, δπ = 1.5, and δy = 0.125.
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interest rate smoothing do not aﬀect the beforehand established dominance of the
interest rate rule9. However, table 4, ﬁgure 4, and the lower contour plot of ﬁgure
8 reveal that this unrestricted dominance is no longer true in the approximated
framework. The interest rate rule outperforms the Ramsey policy under timeless
perspective commitment independently of the smoothing parameter φ, but only in
the case of uncorrelated or slightly correlated shocks (ρ = 0 and ρ = 0.1). This
relation (Jrel.
0 < 100%) is preserved as the degree of autocorrelation increases up
to ρ = 0.3, but only if the degree of interest rate smoothing φ also increases10. If
the degree of interest rate smoothing is not high enough, the Ramsey policy under
timeless perspective commitment arises as the dominant alternative (Jrel.
0 > 100%)
in the case of a slightly persistent cost-push shock. In the case of a higher shock
persistence ρ ∈ [0.4,0.9], the Ramsey policy under timeless perspective commitment
arises as the dominant policy alternative, independently of the smoothing parame-
ter. A comparison of these results to table 3, ﬁgure 3, and the upper contour plot of
ﬁgure 8 should make clear that the policy recommendations diﬀer across the nonlin-
ear and the log-linear model. The diverging results imply a relative welfare reversal
when applying the approximated model. This eﬀect is primarily induced by high
shock persistence values, while low values of ρ induce this eﬀect only if the desire to
smooth interest rate movements φ is also low11. We therefore assess the particular
relevance of the persistence degree in the cost-push shock and the lower relevance
of the interest rate smoothing degree for relative welfare reversals.
For the analysis of diﬀerent values of σ and η, we maintain the conﬁguration α = 0,
ψ = 50, σ = 1.001, η = 2, ρ = 0, φ = 0, δπ = 1.5, and δy = 0.125 in order to induce
9 Again, this dominance is introduced according to the tables 1 and 2 through α = 0, ψ = 50,
σ = 1.001, η = 2, δπ = 1.5, and δy = 0.125.
10 This implies that the central bank is able to lock in welfare gains through moderate interest
rate movements if the cost-push shock is slightly persistent. However, this potential welfare
gain may require high degrees of interest rate smoothing, even if the persistence degree of the
cost-push shock is small (Table 4 indicates that Jrel.
0 < 100% for φ = 0.7 and ρ = 0.3).
11 We obtain 10 welfare reversals by varying ρ at given values of φ and 8 welfare changeovers when
varying φ at given values of ρ. See table 7 for an overview and a ranking of the parameters
according to their relevance for welfare reversals.
15
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0 < 100% and Jrel.
0 < 100%. Table 5, ﬁgure 5, and the upper
contour plot of ﬁgure 9 establish, again, the unrestricted superiority of the Taylor
rule (φ = 0) in the nonlinear model. That is, we obtain V rel.
0 < 100% for all combi-
nations of σ and η. Table 6 and the corresponding ﬁgures 6 and 9 reveal that this
unrestricted dominance is no longer present in the approximated model. For a near
log utility of consumption term (σ = 1.001 and σ = 1.15), the Taylor rule dominates
independently of the inverse real wage elasticity of labor demand η. However, fur-
ther increases of the risk aversion parameter σ require lower values of η in order to
maintain this dominance (Jrel.
0 < 100%). Otherwise, we have Jrel.
0 > 100% and for
higer values of σ this relationship does not depend on the value of η (see the columns
for σ = 2.3 and σ = 2.5 in table 6.). That is, higher values of σ increase the prob-
ability that the Ramsey policy under timeless perspective commitment dominates
against the Taylor rule. Most importantly, the parameter region where Jrel.
0 > 100%
contradicts the relative welfare statement of table 6 (namely V rel.
0 < 100%). That is,
we obtain a relative welfare reversal. However, to asses which of the two parameters
is responsible for this eﬀect is less clear-cut. According to table 6, we obtain 8 rela-
tive welfare changeovers generated by changes of η at given values of σ. By keeping
the values of η ﬁxed, we obtain 10 relative welfare reversals induced by changes of
σ. We therefore assess the particular importance of σ and a weaker relevance of η
for relative welfare reversals after cost-push shocks.
5 Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to determine the parameters driving relative welfare
reversals when approximating the basic New Keynesian model with price adjustment
costs following Rotemberg (1982). We measured absolute welfare under an interest
rate rule ` a la Taylor (1993) and for the Ramsey policy under timeless perspective
commitment after simulating a cost-push shock. A relative welfare measure was
constructed in order to detect the dominance of one policy or the other. Absolute
and relative welfare measurement was pursued for given constellations of parameter
values across the nonlinear and the approximated model. If relative welfare in the
appoximated model contradicted relative welfare in the nonlinear model version
(or vice versa), we deducted a counterfactual policy recommendation or a relative
16
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sets of parameter values in order to identify the most important parameters driving
relative welfare reversals.
We ﬁnd that the assumption of highly ﬂexible prices leads to counterfactual policy
recommendations. That is, the interest rate rule generates lower welfare losses
than the Ramsey policy under timeless perspective commitment in the nonlinear
framework, but not in the approximated model. The same is true for high shares of
capital in output if the degree of price rigidity is not high enough. Therefore, the
asumption of rigid prices is crucial in order to rule out potential reversals in relative
welfare.
A relative welfare reversal eﬀect is always detected when assuming a high persistence
degree of the cost-push shock. This is also the case for noncorrelated or slightly
autocorrelated cost-push shocks if the central bank decides to smooth interest rate
reactions when following an interest rate rule. Since a relative welfare reversal can
always be avoided by assuming a noncorrelated or a weakly autocorrelated shock,
we conclude that this is a key parameter in order to rule out potential reversals in
relative welfare.
The risk aversion parameter of the household and the inverse real wage elasticity of
labor supply are both responsible for the relative welfare reversal eﬀect. However,
the reversal eﬀect occurs more often if the risk aversion parameter is varied. The
ruling out of the relative welfare reversal eﬀect requires lower values of the inverse
real wage elasticity of labor supply if the degree of risk aversion increases. However,
we ﬁnd that the relative welfare reversal eﬀect can always be avoided by assuming
a logarithmic term of consumption utility.
Our results should help to restrict the parameter spaces that allow for welfare-based
policy comparisons in an approximated setting and under stagﬂationary shocks.
Since our results are speciﬁc to the type of shock, it could be interesting to verify
if the parameter ranges that generate relative welfare reversals remain the same for
other shocks (such as technology shocks). It should be interesting to corroborate
our results under the widely assumed price rigidity mechanism of Calvo (1983) as
well.
17
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We follow the same derivation steps as Damjanovic and Nolan (2011), but in our
case for σ ≠ 1 and ǫt as the driving variable for the cost-push shock. For the sake of
comparability, we assume for the time being that a technology parameter At enters
the production function (24):
Yt = AtN1−α
t , 0 ≤ α < 1. (A.1)







































βt Y 1−σ ˆ Ct +
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where O3 denotes terms of third and higher order. Note that setting σ = 1 gives the
corresponding equation (5.1) in Damjanovic and Nolan (2011). The second-order
approximation of the resource constraint (27) is





Inserting (A.5) into (A.4) gives
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ǫ summarizes the mo-
nopolistic distortions present in the economy. Note that this equation corresponds
to equation (5.3) in Damjanovic and Nolan (2011). Following the steps of that pa-
per, we proceed to approximate the New Keynesian Phillips curve (22). However,
we have to rewrite this equation in terms of Yt only. To this end, we eliminate MCt
by inserting (23), and Wt Pt (which enters MCt) by using (21). The labor variable
in (21) is, again, substituted by the production function (A.1). We obtain















which is equation (4.2) in Damjanovic and Nolan (2011) when assuming σ = 1. The
second-order approximation of (A.7) reads









  ˆ Yt 
2



























ˆ Tt = ˆ ǫt +σ ˆ Ct + 
1+η
1−α
  ˆ Yt − ˆ At . (A.9)
Equation (A.8) corresponds to (6.1) and equation (A.9) corresponds to (6.2) of
Damjanovic and Nolan (2011). In that paper, the equation (6.3) is the ﬁrst-order
approximation of the New Keynesian Phillips curve, which in our case results in
ψ
(ǫ−1)Y
Et[ˆ πt −βˆ πt+1] = (σ −1) ˆ Yt + 
1+η
1−α
  ˆ Yt − ˆ At − 
1
ǫ−1
 ˆ ǫt +O2, (A.10)
where O2 denotes terms of second and higher order.
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Combining this equation with the second-order resource constraint (A.5) and the




































βt (1+σ) ˆ Yt +ˆ ǫt + 
1+η
1−α
  ˆ Yt − ˆ At   (σ −1) ˆ Yt +ˆ ǫt + 
1+η
1−α
  ˆ Yt − ˆ At  ,
(A.12)
which corresponds to (6.4) in Damjanovic and Nolan (2011). As done by these
authors, multiplying (A.10) with ˆ Yt gives
ψ
(ǫ−1)Y





  ˆ Yt − ˆ At − 
1
ǫ−1
 ˆ ǫt  ˆ Yt +O3,
(A.13)













βt σ(σ −1) ˆ Yt + 
σ(1+η)
1−α
 ˆ Yt − ˆ At − 
σ
ǫ−1
 ˆ ǫt   ˆ Yt +tip+O3.
(A.14)
20































 ˆ ǫt + 
1+η
1−α




which corresponds to equation (6.7) in Damjanovic and Nolan (2011). Combining
this equation with the extended second-order utility (A.6) gives

























































which corresponds to (5.4) and (5.6) in Damjanovic and Nolan (2011). Note that
setting σ = 1 delivers the expressions in that paper. However, we do not consider
technology shocks (see the production function (24) in our text), which implies
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Table 1: Relative welfare in the nonlinear model, where V rel.
0 =  
V abs.
0  Interest 
V abs.
0  Ramsey  ×100 for
ψ ∈ [0.001,500] and α ∈ [0,0.5]. Parametrization: β = 0.99, σ = 1.001, η = 2, φ = 0, ρ = 0,
δy = 0.125, δπ = 1.5, and ǫ = 6. The shaded areas denote parameter regions implying the





0 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0.001 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999
50 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999
100 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999
150 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999
200 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000
250 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000
300 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000
350 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000
400 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000
500 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000 100.0000
Table 2: Relative welfare in the approximated model, where Jrel.
0 =  
Jabs.
0  Interest 
Jabs.
0  Ramsey  ×100
for ψ ∈ [0.001,500] and α ∈ [0,0.5]. Parametrization: β = 0.99, σ = 1.001, η = 2, φ = 0,
ρ = 0, δy = 0.125, δπ = 1.5, and ǫ = 6. The shaded areas denote parameter regions





0 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0.001 100.0112 100.0103 100.0098 100.0093 100.0087 100.0082 100.0076 100.0071 100.0065 100.0059
50 81.7983 84.4383 86.2588 88.4747 91.1397 94.3119 98.0507 102.4104 107.4276 113.0998
100 74.0288 73.9770 74.2347 74.7180 75.4626 76.5133 77.9265 79.7748 82.1517 85.1785
150 70.1235 69.4343 69.3281 69.4079 69.6997 70.2358 71.0576 72.2179 73.7860 75.8541
200 66.6822 65.6466 65.3505 65.2253 65.2933 65.5824 66.1278 66.9749 68.1831 69.8313
250 63.8066 62.5220 62.0906 61.8207 61.7323 61.8507 62.2079 62.8450 63.8160 65.1934
300 61.4376 59.9579 59.4205 59.0372 58.8264 58.8113 59.0214 59.4949 60.2822 61.4509
350 59.4774 57.8391 57.2154 56.7395 56.4284 56.3038 56.3929 56.7316 57.3672 58.3635
400 57.8389 56.0688 55.3731 54.8199 54.4249 54.2081 54.1952 54.4198 54.9266 55.7760
500 55.2699 53.2931 52.4842 51.8088 51.2806 50.9172 50.7413 50.7825 51.0810 51.6915
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 093Table 3: Relative welfare in the nonlinear model, where V rel.
0 =  
V abs.
0  Interest 
V abs.
0  Ramsey  ×100 for
φ ∈ [0,0.9] and ρ ∈ [0,0.9]. Parametrization: α = 0, ψ = 50, β = 0.99, σ = 1.001, η = 2,
δy = 0.125, δπ = 1.5, and ǫ = 6. The shaded areas denote parameter regions implying the





0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999
0.1 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999
0.2 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999
0.3 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999
0.4 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999
0.5 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999
0.6 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999
0.7 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999
0.8 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999
0.9 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999
Table 4: Relative welfare in the approximated model, where Jrel.
0 =  
Jabs.
0  Interest 
Jabs.
0  Ramsey  ×100
for φ ∈ [0,0.9] and ρ ∈ [0,0.9]. Parametrization: α = 0, ψ = 50, β = 0.99, σ = 1.001, η = 2
δy = 0.125, δπ = 1.5, and ǫ = 6. The shaded areas denote parameter regions implying the





0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0 81.7983 93.8279 108.5212 126.5003 148.4137 174.7072 204.9871 236.4143 260.1588 256.0392
0.1 79.8376 91.1629 104.9564 121.8005 142.3202 166.9981 195.6401 225.9780 250.4035 250.2768
0.2 77.9773 88.6042 101.4961 117.1903 136.2788 159.2658 186.1341 215.1659 240.0136 243.8586
0.3 76.2397 86.1857 98.1889 112.7355 130.3741 151.6115 176.5761 204.0620 228.9970 236.6869
0.4 74.6567 83.9538 95.0998 108.5240 124.7205 144.1758 167.1231 192.8070 217.4053 228.6557
0.5 73.2721 81.9704 92.3146 104.6726 119.4723 137.1550 158.0066 181.6329 205.3749 219.6674
0.6 72.1449 80.3184 89.9485 101.3393 114.8428 130.8291 149.5772 170.9309 193.2163 209.6937
0.7 71.3569 79.1124 88.1614 98.7463 111.1391 125.6177 142.3922 161.3927 181.6273 198.9855
0.8 71.0280 78.5205 87.1899 97.2280 108.8358 122.1958 137.4078 154.3387 172.2598 188.8729
0.9 71.3505 78.8147 87.4213 97.3419 108.7468 121.7728 136.4576 152.6029 169.5080 185.5378
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 093Table 5: Relative welfare in the nonlinear model, where V rel.
0 =  
V abs.
0  Interest 
V abs.
0  Ramsey  ×100 for
η ∈ [2,2.9] and σ ∈ [1.001,2.5]. Parametrization: α = 0, ψ = 50, ρ = 0, φ = 0, β = 0.99,
δy = 0.125, δπ = 1.5, and ǫ = 6. The shaded areas denote parameter regions implying the





1.001 1.15 1.25 1.5 1.75 2.0 2.15 2.25 2.3 2.5
2.0 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999
2.1 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999
2.2 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999
2.3 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999
2.4 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999
2.5 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999
2.6 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999
2.7 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999
2.8 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999
2.9 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999 99.9999
Table 6: Relative welfare in the approximated model, where Jrel.
0 =  
Jabs.
0  Interest 
Jabs.
0  Ramsey  ×100
for η ∈ [2,2.9] and σ ∈ [1.001,2.5]. Parametrization: α = 0, ψ = 50, ρ = 0, φ = 0, β = 0.99,
δy = 0.125, δπ = 1.5, and ǫ = 6. The shaded areas denote parameter regions implying the





1.001 1.15 1.25 1.5 1.75 2.0 2.15 2.25 2.3 2.5
2.0 81.7983 84.0244 85.3926 88.6648 92.0298 95.6848 98.0459 99.6897 100.5316 104.0204
2.1 83.0968 85.5675 87.0978 90.7569 94.4720 98.4312 100.9500 102.6880 103.5737 107.2144
2.2 84.4288 87.1409 88.8306 92.8687 96.9238 101.1749 103.8433 105.6698 106.5963 110.3770
2.3 85.7874 88.7375 90.5839 94.9929 99.3777 103.9085 106.7184 108.6279 109.5923 113.5017
2.4 87.1665 90.3510 92.3514 97.1228 101.8269 106.6253 109.5689 111.5560 112.5557 116.5831
2.5 88.5604 91.9758 94.1272 99.2525 104.2653 109.3194 112.3891 114.4486 115.4811 119.6165
2.6 89.9644 93.6067 95.9062 101.3764 106.6875 111.9855 115.1740 117.3011 118.3639 122.5982
2.7 91.3741 95.2392 97.6836 103.4898 109.0886 114.6190 117.9194 120.1096 121.2005 125.5254
2.8 92.7855 96.8691 99.4553 105.5881 111.4642 117.2161 120.6218 122.8708 123.9879 128.3957
2.9 94.1951 98.4928 101.2173 107.6676 113.8107 119.7735 123.2782 125.5822 126.7235 131.2076
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 093Table 7: Ranking of the model parameters according to the frequency of welfare reversals
following tables 1-6. Values in square brackets indicate the number of welfare reversals at



































































Figure 1: Relative welfare in the nonlinear model, where V rel.
0 =  
V abs.
0  Interest 
V abs.
0  Ramsey   × 100
for ψ ∈ [0.001,500] and α ∈ [0,0.5]. Parametrization: β = 0.99, σ = 1.001, η = 2, φ = 0,





































Figure 2: Relative welfare in the approximated model, where Jrel.
0 =  
Jabs.
0  Interest 
Jabs.
0  Ramsey  ×100
for ψ ∈ [0.001,500] and α ∈ [0,0.5]. Parametrization: β = 0.99, σ = 1.001, η = 2, φ = 0,
ρ = 0, δy = 0.125, δπ = 1.5, and ǫ = 6. For an overview of the plotted values see table 2.
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Figure 3: Relative welfare in the nonlinear model, where V rel.
0 =  
V abs.
0  Interest 
V abs.
0  Ramsey   × 100
for φ ∈ [0,0.9] and ρ ∈ [0,0.9]. Parametrization: α = 0, ψ = 50, β = 0.99, σ = 1.001, η = 2,







































Figure 4: Relative welfare in the approximated model, where Jrel.
0 =  
Jabs.
0  Interest 
Jabs.
0  Ramsey  ×100
for φ ∈ [0,0.9] and ρ ∈ [0,0.9]. Parametrization: α = 0, ψ = 50, β = 0.99, σ = 1.001, η = 2
δy = 0.125, δπ = 1.5, and ǫ = 6. For an overview of the plotted values see table 4.
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Figure 5: Relative welfare in the nonlinear model, where V rel.
0 =  
V abs.
0  Interest 
V abs.
0  Ramsey   × 100
for η ∈ [2,2.9] and σ ∈ [1.001,2.5]. Parametrization: α = 0, ψ = 50, ρ = 0, φ = 0, β = 0.99,




































Figure 6: Relative welfare in the approximated model, where Jrel.
0 =  
Jabs.
0  Interest 
Jabs.
0  Ramsey  ×100
for η ∈ [2,2.9] and σ ∈ [1.001,2.5]. Parametrization: α = 0, ψ = 50, ρ = 0, φ = 0, β = 0.99,
δy = 0.125, δπ = 1.5, and ǫ = 6. For an overview of the plotted values see table 6.
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0  Interest 
V abs.
0  Ramsey   × 100 in the nonlinear model, while the lower ﬁgure corresponds to the
approximated model with Jrel.
0 =  
Jabs.
0  Interest 
Jabs.
0  Ramsey  ×100 for ψ ∈ [0.001,500] and α ∈ [0,0.5].
Parametrization: β = 0.99, σ = 1.001, η = 2, φ = 0, ρ = 0, δy = 0.125, δπ = 1.5, and ǫ = 6.
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0  Interest 
V abs.
0  Ramsey   × 100 in the nonlinear model, while the lower ﬁgure corresponds to the
approximated model with Jrel.
0 =  
Jabs.
0  Interest 
Jabs.
0  Ramsey   × 100 for φ ∈ [0,0.9] and ρ ∈ [0,0.9].
Parametrization: α = 0, ψ = 50, β = 0.99, σ = 1.001, η = 2 δy = 0.125, δπ = 1.5, and ǫ = 6.
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0  Interest 
V abs.
0  Ramsey   × 100 in the nonlinear model, while the lower ﬁgure corresponds to the
approximated model with Jrel.
0 =  
Jabs.
0  Interest 
Jabs.
0  Ramsey   × 100 for η ∈ [2,2.9] and σ ∈ [1.001,2.5].
Parametrization: α = 0, ψ = 50, ρ = 0, φ = 0, β = 0.99, δy = 0.125, δπ = 1.5, and ǫ = 6.
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